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REGISTRATION OF LABOR ORGANIZERS
COMPULSORY REGISTRATION OF LABOR ORGANIZERS
AS A VALID EXERCISE OF STATE POLICE POWER
N A GENERAL proposition, the right of the states to regulate
labor union activities through a reasonable exercise of state
police power has been repeatedly affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court.' As a practical matter, however, the extent of the
states' power in this field has not been too clearly defined. A re-
view of some recent decisions dealing with state statutes requiring
registration or "licensing" of labor organizers will illustrate the
difficulties which the states have encountered in their attempts to
exercise control in this particular manner, and will perhaps indi-
cate in a general way how far such regulations may go without
running into federal legislative and constitutional barriers.
I
Following a trend among the states to exercise closer control
over labor unions, the Texas Legislature in 1943 passed the Man-
ford Act.' The preamble of this act, after stating that labor union
activities affect the economic conditions of the state and country,
declared it to be the policy of the state to regulate such activities
in the manner and to the extent thereinafter set forth. Of the fif-
teen sections of the act the following are pertinent to the purposes
of this discussion:
Section 2(c) defines "labor organizer" as any person who for
pecuniary consideration solicits memberships in or members for
a labor union. Section 5 requires all labor organizers, before
soliciting any members for unions, to obtain from the Secretary
of State an organizer's card; it also provides that applications
I Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Bitters Cafe, 315 U. S. 722 (1942) ; Allen-Bradley
Local No. 111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U. S. 740 (1942)-
2 Tmr STAT. (Vernon, Supp. 1943) art. 5154a.
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shall state applicant's name, union affiliation and be accompanied
by a copy of his credentials, and further that the organizer shall
carry the card when soliciting members and exhibit it upon re-
quest of the person solicited. Section 11 prescribes a civil penalty,
to be assessed against unions for violation of the act, and makes
violation by union officials a misdemeanor punishable by fine and
jail sentence. Section 12 gives district courts, upon application of
the State, power to enforce the act through injunction or other
appropriate writ, and Section 13 makes it the duty of the Attorney
General and of district and county attorneys to enforce the act.
The act became effective in August, 1943 and received its first
test in the courts under the following circumstances:
In September, 1943, in connection with a campaign to organize
the employees of Humble Oil & Refining Company's Baytown re-
finery prior to an election ordered by the National Labor Relations
Board, Local 1002 of the Oil Workers Industrial Union, a CIO
affiliate, arranged for R. J. Thomas, a CIO vice president, to speak
at a meeting in Baytown on the evening of September 23. Thomas
arrived in Houston on the 21st, and the next day the Attorney
General applied to the District Court of Travis County, in Austin,
for a restraining order, based on Sections 5 and 12 of the Man-
ford Act, to enjoin him from soliciting memberships in the union
while in Texas. The petition for the order stated that Thomas had
announced his intention of speaking and soliciting members for
the union at the Baytown meeting, and further stated that he would
do so without an organizer's card. An ex parte order was requested
on the ground that there was "not sufficient time before the defend-
ant makes the threatened speech"3 for notice to be served and re-
turned. Thomas was served with the order in Houston six hours
before his scheduled address.
In spite of the order Thomas addressed the 300 persons at the
meeting as planned. At the conclusion of his speech he extended
a general invitation to those present who were not members of a
3 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 521 (1945).
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union to join Local 1002; then, as if to make absolutely certain of
disobeying the district court's order, he singled out a non-union
man, one Pat O'Sullivan, and personally asked him to join the
union. Moreover, he offered to make out an application card for
him. As a result, the Travis County court held Thomas in con-
tempt and assessed a penalty of three days in jail and a $100 fine.
The order of the court was in general terms, finding that he had
violated the restraining order, and made no distinction between
the solicitations set forth in the Attorney General's petition and
those proved as violations.
In Ex parte Thomas,' the union official petitioned the Texas
Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus, insisting that Section
5, as it had been applied to him, was in contravention of the Four.
teenth Amendment as it incorporates the First,' in that a previous
restraint had been imposed upon his rights of freedom of speech
and of assembly. He also contended that the section was in collision
with the National Labor Relations Act. The court, however, held
the registration requirement to be a valid exercise of the state's
police power, taken "for the protection of the general welfare of
the public, and particularly the laboring class"' in that its purpose
was to protect laborers from being defrauded by imposters in the
guise of labor organizers. It pointed out that Section 5 does not
provide for "licensing" of labor organizers and that issuance of the
card is mandatory, not discretionary with the Secretary of State.
The court conceded that the requirement interfered to a certain
extent with the right of an organizer to speak as the paid repre-
sentative of a union, but, stating that "many statutes have been
enacted in this State which curtail or limit the right of one to op-
erate or speak as agent of another,"' the court likened the require-
4 141 Tex. 591,174 S. W. (2d) 958 (1943).
5 "It is no longer open to doubt that the liberty of the press and of speech is within the
liberty safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from inva-
sion by state action." Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 707 (1931).
6 Ex parte Thomas, 141 Tex. 591,596, 174 S. W. (2d) 958, 961 (1943).
7 Id. at 598, 174 S. W. (2d) at 962.
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ment to that imposed upon securities salesmen, insurance agents,
real estate brokers and the like, and pointed out that such require-
ments had not been held unconstitutional as abridging the right
of free speech. Accordingly the act, as applied, was upheld and
Thomas was remanded to custody.
In Thomas v. Collins,8 a 5-1. decision," the United Slates Supreme
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Rutledge, reversed the deci-
sion of the Texas court. The Court stated that the order holding
Thomas in contempt was so worded that it was necessary to con-
sider the penalty as having been imposed on account of both solici-
tations-the general invitation to the crowd and the specific
solicitation of O'Sullivan-and that the judgment would have to
be affirmed as to both or as to neither."° That being so the Court
considered that Thomas was being punished for urging the audi-
ence in a public speech to join a labor union, and held that Sec-
tion 5, so applied, was unconstitutional. Texas, the Court said,
has power to regulate labor unions with a view to protecting the
public interest, but its regulations "must not trespass upon the
domains set apart for free speech and free assembly.""
The State cited previous pronouncements of the Court to the
effect that regulations of solicitation, in the public interest, which
involve no subjective test or discretionary control, are not open to
constitutional objection," and contended that the Texas statute in
question was such a regulation. But the Court found that Thomas'
general invitation, though perhaps technically a "solicitation,"
was so inextricably a part of his speech that it could not be sub-
jected to regulation without also subjecting the speech to regula-
tion. And the Court considered that a requirement of registration
in order to make a public speech, whether in behalf of a labor
8 323 U. S. 516 (1945).
9 Black, Douglas, Jackson, Murphy and Rutledge, JJ. fox rcwr.,al; Stmne, Ch.j.. and
Frankfurter, Reed and Roberts, J.J.. dissenting.
10 323 U. S. 516, 529 (1945).
"1I d. at 532.
12 Cantwell v. Connecticutt, 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
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organization or a social, religious, business or political cause, was
incompatible with the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.
The Court concluded that free speech, as opposed to property
rights, was a matter which the states, under their police power,
could not restrict in the absence of a "clear and present danger""
to the interests they were entitled to protect, and that Thomas'
speech, made at a lawful public assembly, presented no such
danger." However, while condemning Section 5 as applied to the
Baytown speech, the Court stopped short of declaring it unconstitu-
tional on its face, and clearly indicated that some form of control
would be valid.1" Also, the Court apparently held that the section,
even as applied to Thomas, was not in conflict with the National
Labor Relations Act. 6 But whether Thomas would have been
amenable to punishment for the personal solicitation of O'Sullivan,
had the Travis County court order been differently worded, the
Court chose to leave undecided, that being considered unnecessary
to the decision, and thus the extent of the state's power to require
registration was left largely undefined-or defined only negative-
ly. Texas had simply gone too far. But the distance between the
instant case, which was in the prohibited zone, and the broad con-
cession that the states have some power in the field left room for
a multitude of possible situations, with only the most general indi-
cations as to where the dividing line should be drawn.
The constitutionality of Section 5 was challenged a second time
13 The "clear and present danger" standard for gauiing permissible restrictions of the
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment was first enunciated by Mr. Justice Holmes in
Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919), and has been applied in many subsequent
cases. Neav v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931) ; Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252
(1941) ; West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943), and cases
cited therein.
" De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 (1937).
15 "Once the speaker goes further, however, and engages in conduct which amounts
to more than the right of free speech comprehends, as when he undertakes the collection
of funds or securing subscriptions, he enters a realm where a reasonable registration or
identification requirement may be imposed. In that context such solicitation would be
quite different from the solicitation involved here." Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 540
(1945).
18 "Since a majority of the Court do not agree that § 5 or its present application con-
flicts with the National Labor Relations Act. our decision rests exclusively upon the
grounds we havt- stated .... Id. at 542..
1948]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
in American Federation of Labor v. Mann,"7 this time without bene-
fit of such a clear-cut controversial fact situation as the Thomas
case presented, and the decision, insofar as it clarifies the registra-
tion issue, adds little to that case, because it merely states posi-
tively the generality which the Supreme Court implied. In this case
the American Federation of Labor and others brought action in
a state court under Texas' Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act"
to test the constitutionality of the Manford Act as a whole and to
secure injunctive relief against prosecutions under it. An appeal
from the judgment of the trial court was taken to the Court of
Civil Appeals, which held the following provisions of the act to
be invalid:
1. The requirement that unions file annually a complete and
detailed financial statement.
2. The requirement that union officers, agents, organizers and
representatives be elected annually by a majority vote of members.
3. The requirement that all agreements with employers, con.
taining check-off provisions, be filed with the Secretary of State.
4. The provision prohibiting collection of fees, dues or fines
which would create a fund in excess of union operating require-
ments if so doing would work a hardship on applicants or mem-
bers. -
5. The requirement that unions give applicants for member-
ship a reasonable time after obtaining promise of employment
in which to decide whether they would join the unions, as a condi-
tion to such employment.
6. The provision making it illegal to require union members
who had served in the armed forces to pay back dues as a condi-
tion to reinstatement.
The act, as it stands after the above excisions, contains the fol-
lowing requirements and prohibitions:
1. Unions must file with the Secretary of State annual reports
"1188 S. W. (2d) 276 (TeL Civ. App. 1945).
18 TFx. STAT. (Vernon, Supp. 1943) art. 2524-1.
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giving name and address of union, its officers, and the national or
international organization with which it is affiliated; in addition
a statement of all property owned by the union must be filed. A
copy of the union constitution must be filed with the first report,
and any changes or amendments must be reported within twenty
days.
2. Aliens and convicted felons whose citizenship has not been
restored may not hold any union office or act as organizer.
3. Financial contribution to political parties or candidates by
unions is forbidden.
4. Section 5.
5. The collection of money for the privilege to work or as a
work permit is prohibited.
6. Books of account showing all receipts and expenditures
must be kept by unions, such books to be open for inspection by
members, enforcement officers and grand juries.
7. Expulsion of members, except for good cause and upon
public hearing after due notice and opportunity to be heard, is
prohibited, and courts of competent jurisdiction are authorized to
order the reinstatement of members expelled without good cause.
In considering the validity of Section 5 the court interpreted
the decision in Thomas v. Collins to mean that the registratiov
requirement would be upheld if properly applied" and accord-
ingly ruled that it was a valid exercise of state police power, but
that it was not necessary as a prerequisite to nor a limitation upon
the right of free speech. Under the circumstances of the case a
more definitive statement as to what would constitute a proper
application of the section would probably not have been justified.
At any rate, the decision did not lay down any specific guide lines
in this respect. Moreover, neither party chose to appeal. The deci-
19 "Thus the application of Sec. 5, as a registration statute, to paid labor organizers
who solicit members through other methods than those used by Thomas in the cited case
-that is, otherwise than as a part of a public speech to assembled employees--is left
entirely undetermined; but with the implication that it is valid if properly applied and
invalid only when applied in an improper and unauthorized manner." American Federa.
tion of Labor v. Mann, 188 S. W. (2d) 276, 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
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sion apparently was accepted as conclusive by the Attorney Gen-
eral.: At the time plaintiff unions had pending on appeal in the
United States Supreme Court a suit testing the validity of a Kansas
statute similar in many respects to the Texas statute. The unions
may well have considered that an adjudication of the Kansas ap-
peal would be decisive of the main issues in the Texas case.
This Kansas case, Stapleton v. Mitchell,"' was an action by the
unions to enjoin enforcement of the Kansas Labor Law.22 The plain-
tiffs challenged the constitutionality of the act on the grounds that
its very existence imposed a previous restraint upon the rights of
free speech, press and assembly, deprived them of equal protec-
tion of the law, and that it was in conflict with the National Labor
Relations Act. The cause was tried before a three judge federal
court.
Section 3 of the Kansas act provided that no person should
operate in the state as a union business agent without first obtain-
ing a license from the Secretary of State, paying a $1 fee therefor,
and further that applications should state the name and residence
of applicant and be accompanied by a statement of the president
or secretary of the union showing the authority of the applicant.
It will be noted that the only substantial difference between this
section and Section 5 of the Texas act is that the latter is applica-
ble only to labor organizers who "solicit" memberships, whereas
the Kansas requirement applies to business agents generally, a
distinction which appears to be of controlling significance in the
light of later cases. "Business agent" is defined in the act as any
person who shall act for any union in the issuance of membership
cards, work permits, or in soliciting from any employer any right
or privilege for employees when such union has not been certified
as the bargaining representative for th',se employees.
20 The Labor Union Annual Report form supplied to unions by the Secretary of State
now makes no provision for rendering the detailed financial statement required by Sec.
3 (d), Art. 5 154 a, which was held invalid in the Mann case.
2160 F. Supp. 51 (1945).
22 Kansas Session Laws 1943, c. 191.
[Vol. 2
REGISTRATION OF LABOR ORGANIZERS
After reviewing the Thomas case, the court drew from it the
same general conclusion which was drawn by the Texas court in
the Mann case: the Supreme Court did not nullify the Manford
Act but freely conceded the power of the state to regulate labor
unions so long as the regulations did not interfere with free speech
and assembly. The court also held that it might fairly be inferred
from the Supreme Court opinion that a state may condition the
right of an individual to solicit memberships in a union when that
solicitation partakes of a commercial transaction. This again raised
the difficult question: "When does a solicitation partake of a com-
mercial transaction?"
But the federal court declined, as did the Texas court, to attempt
a definitive answer. The court said:
"... the [United States Supreme] Court did not attempt to draw the
line between the purely doctrinal aspects of union enterprise which is
free from restraint and the purely commercial, which, like all other
enterprises, is subject to reasonable regulation-beyond the observa-
tion that the task was a 'difficult' one. The decision in the IThomas]
case rested upon the concrete clash of actualities. The Court was not
required to draw hypothetical lines-it deliberately refused to do so,
and we must do likewise."' 3
Then, after striking down certain portions of the act as uncon-
stitutional and enjoining their enforcement, the court upheld the
balance of the act, including the licensing provision, stating that it
was not plainly unconstitutional. But at the same time the court
said that it was not adjudicating the constitutionality of the prima
facie valid sections as they might ultimately be construed and ap-
plied. It simply held that they did not, upon their face, encroach
upon fundamental human rights. The court also held that the
Kansas act and the National Labor Relations Act were not in con-
flict on their face, and that it would be time enough to judge the
"operative conflicts" when they actually arose.2'
This judgment was handed down in March, 1945. Whether the
23 Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51, 60 (1945).
24 Id. at 62.
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court would have held the same way had it had before it the Su-
preme Court's decision in Hill v. Florida,2 ' rendered in June, 1945,
presents an interesting problem of interpretation. Both parties
to the Kansas case appealed to the Supreme Court, which dis-
missed the appeals, pursuant to stipulations, without opinion, in
November, 1945,6 and such dismissal would not seem to have the
effect of an approval of the district court's pronouncements. And
in view of the decision in Hill v. Florida it seems quite possible
that the impression gained from the Kansas case that a general
registration or licensing requirement is an enforceable exercise of
state police power, is altogether misleading.
Hill v. Florida would seem to have cut down the states' power
to regulate labor unions, as such, to a merely nominal one. The
case began as a bill filed in a state court, by the Attorney General
of Florida, for an injunction to restrain Hill and the union for
which he was business agent from functioning until they had com-
plied with certain provisions of a Florida labor control act.2" Sec-
tion 4 of this act provided that no person should be licensed as
business agent of a union who had not been a citizen for more
than ten years, who had been convicted of a felony, or who was
not a person of good moral character. Whether applicants met
these requirements was to be determined by a state board. The
basis for the relief sought against Hill was that he had acted as a
business agent in violation of this section.
Section 6 of the act, which was invoked against the union, re-
quired all labor unions operating in the state to file written reports
with the Secretary of State, giving name of union, location of
offices, names and addresses of officers, and to pay a fee of $1.
Motions by Hill and the union to dismiss the bill on grounds that
it violated the Fourteenth Amendment and conflicted with the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act were overruled, and both Hill and the
union were enjoined from further functioning until they had com-
20 325 U. S. 538 (1945).
to McElroy v. Mitchell and Mitchell.. McElroy, 326 U. S. 690 (1945).
3? House Bill No. 142, LAws or FLORIDA, 1943, Chap. 21968, 565.
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plied with the act. The state supreme court affirmed,-" and the
Unied States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Without considering any of the constitutional questions in-
volved, but solely on the basis of conflict with the National Labor
Relations Act, the Court struck down both sections of the Florida
act. The Court pointed out that the declared purpose of the federal
act was to encourage collective bargaining and to protect the full
freedom of workers in the selection of bargaining representa-
tives. -" This full freedom, the Court said, meant freedom to pass
on the representatives' qualifications, and Section 4, inasmuch as
it reposed discretionary power in a board, substituted Florida's
judgment in this respect for the workers' judgment. In view of
past decisions, so much of the opinion was to be expected. Section
4 was not merely a previous identification requirement, but an
attempt to give the state board discretionary power to say who
should and who should not serve as union business agents. The
rather startling inference, however, which is to be gathered from
the remainder of the opinion, is that even if Section 4 had not
been discretionary, if it had been merely a previous identification
requirement such as that contained in the Kansas act, the Court's
holding would have been the same. It will be remembered that
Section 6 of the Florida act was in no respect discretionary. More-
cver, it placed no unreasonable burden upon the unions. It merely
required that a union file with the Secretary of State a report giv-
ing its name, location of its office and the names and addresses of
its officers, and pay a nominal fee. It is difficult to see how a state
could exercise any effective control whatsoever without this basic
information. Yet. Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the majority of
the Court, said:
28 Hill v. State ex rel. Watson, 155 Fla. 254. 19 So. (2d) 857 (1944).
29 Since the decision in Hill v. Florida the National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 449
(1935), has been substantially amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,
Public L No. 101 (H. R. 3020), 80th Congress, but the declared policy of "encouraging
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining" and of "protecting the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association, self organization, and designation of representa-
tives of their own choosing for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of
their employment" remains unchanged.
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"Section 6, as here applied, stands no better [than Section 4]. The
requirement as to the filing of information... does not in and of itself,
conflict with the Federal Act. But for failure to comply, this union has
been enjoined from functioning as a labor union. It could not without
violating the injunction and also subjecting itself to the possibility of
criminal punishment even attempt to bargain to settle a controversy or
a strike. It is the sanction here imposed, and not the duty to report,
which brings about a situation inconsistent with the federally pro.
tected process of collective bargaining." 30
Would not the same objection apply to an attempt to enforce a
statute requiring general registration of labor organizers or busi-
ness agents? A union cannot effectively "bargain to settle a strike
or controversy" without its professional agents. They are, as the
Court itself states, the bargaining representatives. A sanction im-
posed upon them would seem to bring about a situation just as
inconsistent with the federally protected process of collective bar-
gaining as was brought about by the sanction imposed on the
union itself."'
The opinion goes further and intimates that it is not necessarily
the injunctive sanction alone that is objectionable, but that an
attempt to enforce the requirement by resort to punishment for
past violations would also be unlawful. Again speaking through
Mr. Justice Black the Court said:
"'... if the union or its representatives acted as bargaining agents
without making the required reports, presumably they would be liable
both to punishment for contempt of court and to conviction under the
misdemeanor section of the act. Such an obstacle to collective bargain-
ing cannot be created consistently with the Federal Act." 3 2
30 Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538, 543 (1945). It is interesting to note that Section 6 of
the Florida act, which is here held invalid as in conflict with the NLRA, is a much less
onerous requirement than Section 3 of the Texas act. Section 3, although considerably
pared down by the Mann case, still requires the same information required by Section 6
of the Florida act, plus a statement of all property owned by the union, including any
moneys on hand. However, Section 3 continues to be enforced in spite of Hill v. Florida.
31 An amicus curiae brief was filed for the United States in Thomas v. Collins, in
behalf of the contention that Section 5 of the Manford Act, which is not a general require-
ment but applicable only to organizers who solicit members, is inconsistent with the
NLRA. It would seem, a fortiori, that the same argument could be made against the gen-
eral licensing provision of the Florida act, even in the absence of the discretionary
feature.
32 Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538, 543 (1945).
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Does the Court mean that both the threat of punishment for con-
tempt and conviction under the misdemeanor section of the act
comprise the fatal obstacle, or that either one alone would suffice?
Chief Justice Stone, dissenting in part from the majority of the
Court, apparently interpreted the majority opinion to mean the
latter. He said:
"... I can find no logical or persuasive legal ground or practical
reason for saying that Congress by the enactment of the National
Labor Relations Act intended to preclude the state from exercising to
the utmost extent its sovereign power to enforce the lawful demands of
Section 6 of the Florida Act. There is no more occasion for implying
such a Congressional purpose where the union is prevented from func-
tioning by punishment or injunction for a violation of a valid state
law, than for saying that Congress, by the National Labor Relations
Act, intended to forbid the states to arrest and imprison a labor leader
for the violation of any other valid state law, because that would pre.
vent his or the union's functioning under the National Labor Relations
Act." 3 3 (Emphasis added.)
It appears difficult at first glance to reconcile this case with the
Thomas case in which the Court held that the registration require-
ment of the Texas act did not conflict with the federal act,3 ' but
the Court distinguished the two cases as follows:
"In that case [Thomas v. Collins] we did not have, as here, to deal
with such a direct impediment to the free exercise of the federally
established right to collective bargaining."" (Emphasis added.)
As suggested above, the decision in Hill v. Florida might log-
ically have been the same even if the licensing provision had not
been discretionary, and the only difference between the Florida
and Texas requirements, other than the discretionary feature, is
that the former, like that of Kansas, is a general requirement
3 Id. at 546. It is suggested in a note in 55 YALE L. J. 440 (1946) that it might be a
more "sophisticated" appraisal to view Section 6 as having been struck down, not so much
because of its conflict with the NLRA, as because it was a part of an obviously antilabor
statute; in other words, that if it had not been in bad company, it might have been sus-
tained, and that similar requirements, in different settings might be upheld in the future.
s4See note 16 supra.
8s Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538, 543 (1946).
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applicable to all business agents, while the latter applies only to
the function of soliciting memberships. And it would seem to
follow that while the former is regarded as a direct impediment
to collective bargaining, the latter, though perhaps an impediment,
is not "such a direct" one as to be objectionable. The difference
seems to be one of degree.
The uncertainty as to what the states can and cannot do, which
still exists in spite of, or perhaps because of, the foregoing deci-
sions, is well illustrated by the recent California case, In re Por-
terfield."8 Porterfield, a labor organizer, applied for a writ of
habeas corpus to secure release from custody after conviction of
violating an ordinance of the city of Redding, which prohibited
soliciting for compensation, without license, of memberships in
organizations requiring payment of dues. The ordinance was de-
clared invalid by the court because it, like the Florida require-
ment, gave discretion to a local body to issue or withhold licenses
on the basis of its appraisal of applicants' good moral character.
But in discussing the general question of state and local registra-
tion requirements designed to protect the public against fraud, the
court expressed its quandary over the reasoning in Thomas v.
Collins. The court took the view that the Supreme Court held it
lawful for Thomas to solicit the 300 persons without having pro-
cured a card, but that whether it was lawful to solicit the individual
had been left an open question. The court said:
"Of course, Thomas was at least equally carrying on his business of
soliciting members for compensation when he addressed 300 as when
he addressed one. It would seem that he was more efficiently carrying
on his business when addressing 300 than he would have been by
addressing one and that the need for whatever protection the statute
afforded the public was correspondingly greater in respect to the
larger number. There scarcely seems to be magic in the number 300.
... If the speaker may lawfully solicit two persons to join a union,
may he not solicit one?" s3
s628 CaL (2d) (Adv. 102), 168 P. (2d) 706 (1946).
31 Id. at 718.
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II
From the foregoing decisions it is believed that the following
conclusions may safely be drawn:
1. A requirement that labor organizers register before making
"routine business" solicitations of memberships is a valid exercise
of state police power, provided it does not operate as a prerequisite
to the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.
2. A general, non-discretionary requirement of registration be-
fore functioning as a business agent, for a union whose activities
"affect" interstate commerce, though perhaps not objectionable
on constitutional grounds, is of questionable validity on the ground
of conflict with the National Labor Relations Act, as amended."
This is particularly true if the requirement is attempted to be en-
forced by injunction."
The questions under the first conclusion, above, that have been
left unanswered are: (a) under what factual circumstances is
solicitation a routine business matter, hence subject to regulation,
and (b) when does it partake of a quality that brings it under
the protection of the free speech guaranty? Without answers to
these questions the conclusion is of little practical value. The Su-
preme Court of the United States has deliberately refused to draw
the dividing line. It has said only that when a labor leader makes
a speech in behalf of unionism and solicits his audience to join
a union, he is beyond the line. As the late Justice Cardozo once
put it, in reference to another matter, "The hinterland may be
plain when the frontier is uncertain.""0
The difficulty of locating a dividing line lies in the fact that a
good many day-to-day solicitations of individual memberships are
bound to involve in some measure the "doctrinal aspects" of union
enterprise-are bound to entail a job of "selling" the individual
on the idea of unionism. On the other hand, many solicitations will
s8 The National Labor Relations Act applies only to activities which "affect" inter-
state commerce. Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937).
389 Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538 (1945).
40 Connolly v. Scudder, 247 N. Y. 401,160 N. E. 655 (1928).
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not. Many, perhaps most, will require little more than a proffered
application blank and a fountain pen. And there would seem to
be no feasible way, in practice, to make a distinction between the
two. The fraud which the registration statutes are designed to
protect against may be equally latent in both kinds of solicitation.
Therefore, registration must be a prerequisite to engaging in the
general class of endeavor, or it will not serve its purpose. Regis-
tration was not intended, or at least it could not legitimately have
been intended, as a prerequisite to the propounding of doctrine.
If it has the latter effect in some instances, then it can only be
said that in this "peripheral zone"' the right to utter words must
give way to the right to control if this valuable police function is
to be performed at all. Free speech will not suffer any greater
detriment as a result of such a requirement, honestly applied, than
it has suffered because securities salesmen must register before
pursuing their occupation. On the other hand, the selling of securi-
ties is no more in need of protective regulation than are certain
aspects of union enterprise. Unionism is the concrete expression
of a social ideal, but it is also big business.
Perhaps it is not possible to draw a more precise rule from all
the decisions than to say that when a man is making what, accord-
ing to "our traditional notions,""2 is a speech, whether to one or to
one thousand, his act is not, in the absence of a clear and present
danger to the interests which the states are entitled to protect, sub.
ject to regulation."3 Under such a rule, an organizer out on a con-
struction job signing up a worker, even though he resorts in some
41 Ibid.
42 The Supreme Court has found it desirable to resort to the "traditional notions"
standard on occasion. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U. S. 310
(1945).
43 A precise, rigid rule inclusive enough to cover and do justice in all possible situa-
tions can hardly be conceived. Absence of ironclad rigidity has the advantage of alloiwing
a vigilant court to cut through technical subterfuge and divine the real import of each
ease. Thus the Supreme Court has prevented freedom of religion from being curtailed by
a too liberal application of a valid city ordinance, Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413 (1943),
and has also prevented individuals from escaping just regulation by the device of dress-
ing up what is really a business transaction with an artificial coating of "free speech."
Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U. S. 52 (1942).
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degree to "doctrinal" persuasion, is not any more engaged in mak-
ing a speech than is an insurance agent, when selling a policy.
Thomas obviously did make a speech at Baytown. The distinction
between the two is easily discerned by the eye of common sense
and fair play.
On the other hand, Thomas also made what in every respect
was a business solicitation-that of O'Sullivan. It was separable
from and unnecessary to his speech, and there is no more reason
to say that it was protected merely because it immediately followed
a protected act than to say that an assault and battery on O'Sulli-
van would have been. Thomas deliberately brought himself within
the scope of a reasonable regulation, and had the district court's
order been differently worded, Thomas should have been amenable
to punishment.
Once it is understood and settled that the states may require reg-
istration only as a means of protecting the public against being
defrauded and not to protect it against a particular doctrine," the
matter of registration prior to soliciting memberships would seem
to become largely academic. Labor organizers who at any time are
required to engage in the kind of activity to which such statutes are
meant to apply will register once, and that registration will, as a
practical matter, cover all shadings of solicitation from the purely
business through the purely doctrinal. Such statutes accrue to the
benefit of bona fide labor unions as well as the public, and it
seems a fair surmise that unions will view them in that light
if they are properly applied.' Section 5 was not challenged
by the unions in Texas until they were given reason to believe
44 "But it cannot be the duty, because it is not the right, of the state to protect the
public against false doctrine. The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose
public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind through regulating
the press, speech, and religion. In this field every person must be his own watchman for
truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate the true from the
false for us." Jackson, J. concurring in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. at 545.
45 There were 223 labor organizers' cards issued under the Texas statute between its
effective date and the Thomas case. Cards are still being issued by the Secretary of State
in spite of the case, and there is no prosecution by the state of record under Section 5
other than that of Thomas.
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that it might be so literally interpreted that it could be used
as a weapon to silence or harass union spokesmen. That it was
so employed in the Thomas case was obviously the opinion of
at least one member of the United States Supreme Court. Mr.
Justice Jackson, in his concurring opinion in that case, stated with
unusual frankness:
"I cannot escape the impression that the injunction sought before
he had reached the state was an effort to forestall him from speaking
at all and that the contempt is based in part at least on the fact that he
did make a public labor speech.""
Whatever else may be said about the case, it cannot be denied
that its practical result is that the State of Texas continues to exer-
cise the valuable and legitimate police function of registering
labor organizers who solicit memberships. At the same time our
traditional concept of free speech lost nothing of its substance
and meaning.
E. P. Van Zandt, Jr.
46 Thomasv. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 548 (1945).
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